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COMMENT
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE:
AN EXPANDING APPROACH TO
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
In 1972 the Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
established the federal common law of public nuisance for
the abatement of air and water pollution. Since that time, a
conflict has arisen in the federal courts regardingthe scope
of this cause of action. This articlediscusses the federal common law nuisance doctrine as applied in water pollution
cases and examines its inconsistent application by the
federal courts of appeals.The authorcriticizes the restrictive
approach that some courts have taken regarding the doctrine and advocates a more expansive use of the federal common law of nuisance for environmentalprotection.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Public awareness of the need to protect our environment from
degradation and our natural resources from complete exhaustion is
widespread. Historically, most of the protections have been initiated
through federal1 and state2 environmental legislation, with key
enactments designed to safeguard our air 3 and water4 resources.
Recently, however, the courts also have played an active role.' A
significant element of this surge of judicial participation is the
development of the federal common law of public nuisance.
The federal common law of public nuisance was created in 1972
by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark decision of

1. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. 1979);
Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1976 & Supp. 1979); National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
2. See e.g., Maryland Environmental Policy Act, MD. NAT. RES, CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305
(1974).

3. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7706 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
4. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
5. See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); National Sea
Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert: granted, 101 S. Ct. 314
(1980); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
1310 (1980).

19801

Federal Common Law of Nuisance

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,6 and primarily has been employed as a
cause of action in water pollution cases.7 The Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, however, furnished
minimal guidance for the development of the federal nuisance law.
As a result, "[tihe fresh clay thus handed the lower courts was so soft
that their attempts to formulate a coherent body of law were halting,
inconsistent, and often imbued with a judicial conservatism at odds
with the progressive and innovative spirit of Illinois."s
From the ensuing confusion, a conflict emerged in the federal
courts regarding the application of the federal common law of public
nuisance in water pollution actions. Two positions have evolved from
this controversy. One view supports a very narrow interpretation of
Illinois v. Milwaukee that ultimately restricts the utilization of the
federal nuisance law. The position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, first set forth in 1976, 9 exemplifies this
restrictive approach. The opposing viewpoint advocates a more expansive reading of Illinois v. Milwaukee, finding that the pervasive
federal interest in maintaining the quality of the nation's interstate
and navigable waters mandates application of the federal nuisance
doctrine in a water pollution controversy. Recent decisions of the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Third10 and Seventh" Cir-

6. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See text accompanying notes 59-77 infra Illinois initiated the action in
the United States Supreme Court. Refusing to extend its jurisdiction to hear the case, the
Court remanded the action to the federal district court. 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972). Plaintiff
then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
After several preliminary motions were discussed, 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Envir. Rep.
Cases) 1849 (N.D. Ill. 1972); 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973), the district court decided the
case on its merits, 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Envir. Rep. Cases) 2018 (N.D. Ill. 1978). This decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which
rendered its opinion in 1979. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310
(1980). Because of the confusing procedural posture of this continuing litigation, the
Seventh Circuit's decision will hereinafter be referred to as Illinois v. Milwaukee II.
7. See e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); National Sea
Clarnmers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cerL granted, 101 S. Ct. 314
(1980); United States ex rel Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 365 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill.
1973). Recently, the federal common law of public nuisance was applied in a suit alleging
groundwater pollution. See United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 14 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) (Envir. Rep. Cases) 2010 (D. Conn. 1980). The federal common law of public
nuisance also has been invoked in cases of air pollution. See e.g., New England Legal
Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979). For a discussion of the viability of
the federal common law of public nuisance in interstate air pollution suits, see Poss,
FederalCommon Law Suits to Abate lnterstateAirPollution,4 HARV. ENVIR. L. REV. 117
(1980).
8. Comment, Seventh Circuit Interprets Federal Common Law of Nuisance to Authorize
Municipalities to Sue for Damages,9 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10168, 10168 (1979).
9. See Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (see text accompanying notes 83-100 infra). See also Massachusetts
v. United States Veterans Administration, 514 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining
Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
10. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert granted,
101 S. Ct. 314 (1980).
11. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
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cuits, applying the nuisance doctrine in innovative ways, reflect the
far-reaching implications of this expanded approach for pollution
control in general.
This comment explores and analyzes the development of the
federal common law of public nuisance under both approaches to the
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee.12 Although some
courts have breathed new life into the federal common law of
nuisance, expanded application of this federal nuisance doctrine as a
judicial tool for remedying water pollution will not go unchecked.
Certain procedural and substantive barriers may preclude a claim for
relief in a federal nuisance action. After reviewing the divergent approaches and the potential restraints, this comment recommends
that courts confronted with a federal common law nuisance action
adopt the more expansive approach in their application of the
nuisance doctrine as a means to abate water pollution.
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
A. Background-Federal Common Law in General
To fully comprehend the federal nuisance doctrine, it is necessary to
examine the general framework from which it emerged. Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 stipulated that "the laws of the several
states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision" in civil actions
brought in the federal courts. 3 In Swift v. Tyson,14 however, the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the reference to state laws
made in section 34 as excluding the decisional rules formulated by
state courts.' 5 The Court's narrow interpretation of section 34 provided the federal judiciary with a reason for developing a body of
federal general common law and for applying it in suits brought in
federal court, even when the federal common law differed substantially from the law of the state courts.' 6
For nearly a century, the rule of Swift v. Tyson remained intact
until the Supreme Court overruled that decision in the seminal case

12. For other discussions of the federal common law of public nuisance, see W. RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977); V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 20-25 (Supp. 1980); Comment, Federal Common Law and the
Environment Illinois v. Milwaukee, 2 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10168 (1972).
13. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789). Subsequent revisions of the Act have not resulted in substantial changes of the original language. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
14. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
15. Id at 18-19. The term "laws" did include state statutes and long established local customs having the force of law. Id at 18.
16. Id at 18-19. There were primarily two benefits that the Court indicated would result
from its decision: (1) a single body of common law to be applied by all federal courts; and
(2) with all state courts following uniform federal decisions, a single body of substantive
law for the entire country would be established. Id
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of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 7 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Brandeis declared: "There is no general federal common
law.""' Although this pronouncement apparently sounded the deathknell for the future growth of any federal common law, on the same
day that Erie was handed down, the Court decided Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 19 basing its holding directly on federal common law.20 Hinderlidertherefore provided for
the evolution of some "specialized federal common law."',
In the decades since Hinderlider,the substantive areas of law in
which federal common law has been applied have expanded. They include, for example, obligations to or by the United States,22 labor
law, 2 3 regulations affecting interstate carriers, 4 unfair competition
affecting interstate commerce,"5 and international affairs.26 The
justifications relied upon by the courts to fashion federal common
law in these diverse areas and thus avoid the limits of Erie must be

17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The suit in Erie involved a diversity action brought in New York to
recover for injuries sustained by a pedestrian in Pennsylvania who was struck by an
object projecting from a passing freight train. Id at 69.
18. Id at 78. As Justice Brandeis stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of
the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a Statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power on the federal courts.
Id The federal courts, therefore, were restricted from applying federal common law in
actions based upon diversity jurisdiction.
19. 304 U.S. 92 (1938). The suit involved a dispute between a state and an out-of-state corporation over the apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream. Id at 95-98.
20. Id at 110. The Court in Hinderliderdetermined that the issue of whether the water of an
interstate stream must be apportioned between the two states through which it flows presented a federal question, requiring application of federal common law to settle the controversy, for "neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." Id
The Court relied upon federal interstate common law.
21. See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie - and of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383, 405 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
22. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 406 (1947); United States v.
County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943).
23. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
24. See, e.g., Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948).
25. See, e.g., Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert denie4
358 U.S. 829 (1958); Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.
1951).
26. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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considered within the context of our federal system of government. 7
The constraints of federalism-the allocation of power between the
federal and state governments, with the general powers reserved to
the states2 -are relevant to the development of federal common
law. 29 Generally, the powers of the federal government were granted
to Congress, with that body employing its discretion in determining
how to exercise its powers.3 0 These federal powers are limited, however, and must be viewed "against the background of the total corpus juris of the states,"' 3' because the exercise of these powers may
override existing state law and diminish state power. 32 The expansion of federal common lawmaking by the federal courts strains this
concept of federalism, for the judiciary "exercises an initiative normally left to Congress, ousts state law, and yet acts without the
27. Various methods have been suggested for classifying the justifications for developing
federal common law. See Friendly, supra note 21, at 421. Judge Friendly discussed four
techniques used by the courts to create federal common law: (1) "spontaneous generation"
of federal common law when important federal policy considerations are implicated; (2) an
additional federal remedy implied from a federal statute; (3) construing a jurisdictional
statute as providing the power to formulate substantive law; and (4) the normal filling of
statutory interstices. Id
In Hill The Law-Making Power of the FederalCourts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967), the author suggested four zones in which federal common law could be made freely, but outside of which state law must apply. These include:
(1) cases in which a state is a party; (2) cases in maritime law; (3) cases involving the proprietary duties of the United States; and (4) cases in international affairs. Id
Hill's zone analysis was criticized in Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1512, 1515, 1517-31 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note]. Utilization of this approach
only leads to proliferation of zones rather than clearly defined considerations to be analyzed in reference to the invocation of federal common law. Id at 1516-17. Instead, a
general presumption is suggested: application of state law is favored over federal decisional law. The author delineated three special categories of cases "undermining" this
presumption in which federal common law can be developed: (1) cases in which the concept
of national sovereignty dictates a single, practical solution; (2) cases in which Congress
has delegated lawmaking authority, either explicitly or implicitly, to the courts; and (3)
cases in which the federal courts are required to formulate remedies for breaches of federal
law. Id at 1519-26. In addition, the presumption in favor of state law is "overridden"
when application of federal law is necessary to foster and encourage overriding federal interests or policies and to promote nationally uniform decisional rules. Id at 1526-31.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
29. See Note, supra note 27, at 1517-31.
30. Monaghan, The Supreme CourM 1974 Term - Foreward"ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1975).
31. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 471 (2d ed. 1973).
32. See Note, The Competence of FederalCourts to FormulateRules of Decision, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1084 (1964). Federal law, including federal common law, would preempt state law by
virtue of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
See generally Friendly, supra note 21.
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political checks on national power created by state representation in
Congress. ' 3 To legitimize displacement of state law, the federal
courts must rely upon the Constitution, a statute, or a treaty to
pro34
vide the source of authority for creating federal common law.
On the other hand, the concept of national unity embodied in the
basic principles of federalism justify the creation of federal common
law. Nowhere is this more evident than in the use of federal common
law in settling interstate disputes 3' or in resolving questions affecting relations with foreign nations. 36 Judicial power to fashion federal common law most often is gleaned from federal statutes.37 In addition to filling statutory interstices, which is the most basic reason
for initiating federal common lawmaking and is an unquestioned role
of the federal courts, 3 the authority to establish federal common law
has been inferred from federal statutes conferring jurisdiction, 39 and
from those preempting state law, either explicitly or implicitly.40 In
still other instances, federal common law has been applied to further
"

33. Monaghan, The Supreme Court; 1974 Term - Foreward"ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1975).
34. Id at 12. This is also required by the Rules of Decision Act, which provides that "[tlhe
laws of the several states, except where the Constitutionor treaties of the UnitedStates or
Acts of Congress otherwise requireorprovide,shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976) (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674
(1965); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
36. See e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
37. See Note, The Competence of FederalCourts to FormulateRules of Decision, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1084, 1089 (1964). The Constitution also provides a source for developing federal
common law. It has been suggested that when considering the constitutional basis,
perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on a textual analysis of the Constitution, and
instead more explicit attention should be focused on "the method of inference from the
structures and relationships created by the Constitution in all its parts or in some principle part." C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-7 (1969).
Accord, Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreward"ConstitutionalCommon
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1975) ("The Constitution is no less susceptible to interpretation through a consideration of its text, structure and purposes than are statutes."). An
argument in favor of this approach was determinative of the Supreme Court's authority
to create federal common law in interstate disputes, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972) ("basic interests of federalism") and in foreign relations, see Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). When analyzed in a structural context, the Constitution can be viewed as authority for the creation of federal common law.
38. See 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 929, 935 n.37 (1977).
39. The derivative power to create federal common law from a jurisdictional grant has been
most significant in the area of admiralty. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl 1 ("The judicial
Power shall extend.., to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction...."). See also
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (creation of federal common
law in the area of labor law because federal labor statute conferred jurisdiction on federal
court).
40. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (Smith Act preempts state laws providing for registration of aliens).
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an overriding federal interest or policy4 1 or to fulfill the need for national uniformity regarding certain programs or actions.4 2
B.

The Federal Nuisance Doctrine

The recognition of federal common law as a basis for abating environmental pollution has its roots in the early twentieth century. In
Missouri v. Illinois,43 the State of Missouri sought to enjoin the City
of Chicago and the State of Illinois from discharging raw sewage
through an artificial channel into waters eventually emptying into
the Mississippi River. The Mississippi was a water source for the
City of St. Louis, and thus the continued dumping, it was alleged,
would endanger the health of Missouri citizens who drank or used
the water." The Supreme Court accepted the case under its original
jurisdiction,5 but declined to grant the relief sought because
Missouri did not adequately prove its allegations. 46 The case is significant because the Court recognized the validity of a state's claim
against another state for abatement of a public nuisance caused by
pollution emanating from the defendant state. One year later, in
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,47 the Court again decided a pollution suit based on an assertion of public nuisance. In enjoining a
private business from further discharging noxious fumes that were
polluting the air of a neighboring state, the Court spoke of the
"quasi-sovereign" right of a state to be free of a nuisance created
by
a source outside its borders and to protect its environment from degradation. 4 Not until 1971, however, did the general public nuisance
theory expressed in these early cases emerge as a theory of federal
common law.
In Texas v. Pankey," the State of Texas sued to enjoin New
Mexico ranchers from using a chlorinated camphor pesticide to pro-

41. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also Note, supra note 27, at 1527-29.
42. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also Note, supra note 27, at 1529-31.
43. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
44. Id at 497.
45. The Court's original jurisdiction is set forth in the U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, which
provides:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under Regulations as the Congress shall make.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976), which states: "The Supreme Court shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) all controversies between two or more States ......
46. 200 U.S. 496, 523-26 (1906).
47. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
48. Id at 237-38.
49. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). For a further discussion of the Pankey decision, see Note,
FederalCommon Law and InterstatePollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1972).
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tect their rangelands from a caterpillar infestation. The state asserted that rainfall run-off would carry quantities of the chemical into a river that ultimately formed the water source for several municipalities in Texas. 50 In a bold and innovative decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a state's
quasi-sovereign ecological right to be free from the degradation of its
environment and natural resources caused by pollution originating
from sources outside the state's borders is an interest based in federal common law. 51 The court interpreted the Supreme Court's
language in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.5 to support this conclusion. Although the Supreme Court had not recognized a federal
source for the right, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Tennessee Copper extended to this quasi-sovereign interest "a status of direct protectability and justiciability in relation to the Constitution." 53 The
Tenth Circuit determined that "legal concepts and developments"
occurring since Tennessee Copper justified the view that federal
common law is the source of this state interest.5 4 In concluding that a
state's ecological right is a matter of federal concern, the court
stated:
Federal common law and not the varying common law of the
individual states is, we think, entitled and necessary to be
recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with
the environmental rights of a state against improper impairment by sources outside its domain. The more would this
seem to be imperative in the present era of growing concern
on the part of the State about its ecological conditions and
impairments of them.... Until the field has been made the
subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights.55
After recognizing that the state's nuisance claim presented a federal
question, the court held that the phrase "arises under the... laws...

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

441 F.2d 236, 237-38 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id at 240.
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id The court, however, never explained what it had in mind when it referred to "developments" occurring since Tennessee Copper.
55. Id at 241.
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of the United States,"56 as used in the federal question jurisdictional
statute, encompassed federal common law.5 7 Federal courts were
therefore armed with the requisite jurisdictional basis upon which to
hear suits containing federal common law claims.
Initially reluctant to follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit, 58 the
Supreme Court eventually recognized and expanded the foundation
laid in Pankey concerning the application of the federal common law
of public nuisance in water pollution disputes. In 1972, the Court decided Illinois v. City of Milwaukee5 9 and carved out an important
area of specialized federal common law. This exception to the Erie
doctrine encouraged the federal courts to participate more actively
in environmental protection.
In Illinois v. Milwaukee, the State of Illinois instituted an action
in the Supreme Court against four Wisconsin cities and two sewage
commissions for their alleged discharges of inadequately treated
waste into Lake Michigan, which had severely polluted this inter-

56. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. 1979). The federal question statute establishing jurisdiction in
the federal courts provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States, except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action
brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or
employee thereof in his official capacity.
Id (emphasis added).
57. 441 F.2d 236, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1971).
58. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the Supreme Court declined to
exercise its original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (Supp. 1979) and article III of
the Constitution to hear a case brought by the State of Ohio complaining of a public
nuisance resulting from mercury pollution of Lake Erie allegedly caused by three nonresident corporations. At the heart of its refusal was the Court's reluctance to offer itself as a
tribunal of first impression. 401 U.S. at 504. The Court felt compelled to preserve its
primary function as an appellate court. Thus, the Court held that its grant of original
jurisdiction could be exercised at its discretion. Id In refusing Ohio leave to file the complaint, the Court concluded that there were other forums available to the plaintiff and that
the issues of the case arose under state common law and did not address questions relevant to federal law. Id at 503-04. The Court never discussed application of federal common law. For further analysis of Wyandotte, see Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and
Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REV.
691 (1970); Comment, FederalCommon Law and the Environment Illinois v. Milwaukee,
2 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10168, 10170 (1972).
59. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For further discussion of the case, see Campbell, Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee: Federal Question JurisdictionThrough FederalCommon Law, 3 ENV. L. 267
(1973); Comment, Federal Common Law and the Environment Illinois v. Milwaukee, 2
ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10168 (1972); Comment, The Expansion of Federal Common Law
and Federal QuestionJurisdiction,10 Hous. L. REV. 121 (1972); 49 DEN. L.J. 609 (1973);
77 DICK. L. REV. 451 (1973); 7 SUFFOLK L. REV. 790 (1973); 1972 Wis. L. REV. 597.
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state body of water. 60 Although the Supreme Court declined to
assume jurisdiction over the controversy, 61 the Court did not foreclose the federal system as a judicial forum and accordingly estabfished jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. Following Pankey, the
Court recognized that federal common law was sufficient to support
federal question jurisdiction.6 2 In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that the term "laws," as used in the federal
question
63
jurisdictional statute, embraced federal common law.

60. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). In its discussion of the facts, the Court stated: "The cause of action
alleged is pollution by the defendants of Lake Michigan, a body of interstate water.
According to plaintiff, some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and
other waste materials are discharged daily into the lake in the Milwaukee area alone." Id
(emphasis added). As this statement of facts indicates, the Court was acting to diminish
the pollution of an interstate body of water, and there was no suggestion by the Court
that the federal nuisance cause of action it was fashioning stemmed from any interstate
movement of pollution.
61. Id at 93-98. As in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the Court
refused to compromise its primary function as an appellate tribunal. It distinguished the
earlier decision, however, from its refusal in the present case, determining that Wyandotte
"was based on the preoccupation with public nuisance under Ohio law, not the federal
common law." 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972). In its analysis, the Court also determinedthat Illinois' request to find the defendants "instrumentalities" of the State of Wisconsin was justified and thus the suit would be an action against Wisconsin and would invoke the
Court's original jurisdiction. Although in the past, actions against public entities could be
attributed to a state and thus warrant joinder of the state as a party defendant, such
joinder is not mandatory. Id at 96-97. In addition, the term "states" as used in 28
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. 1979) - the statute conferring original jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court when certain conditions exist - does not include a state's political subdivision. Rather, § 1251(b)(3) is the appropriate jurisdictional statute under which the Court
has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction in actions brought by a state against citizens
of another state, municipalities, or other lesser political units. 406 U.S. at 98.
62. Id at 98-101 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971)). The Court
quoted the controlling principle set forth in Pankey:
As the field of federal common law has been given necessary expansion into
matters of federal concern and relationship (where no applicable federal statute
exists, as there does not here), the ecological rights of a State in the improper
impairment of them from sources outside the State's own territory, now would
and should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal
common law and so directly constituting a question arising under the laws of the
United States.
406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971)).
63. 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972). The Court also discussed several earlier opinions in support of its
conclusion. Id For example, in Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held:
That a cause of action similarly "arises under" federal law if the dispositive
issues stated in the complaint require the application of federal common law....
The word "laws" in § 1331 should be construed to include laws created by federal
judicial decisions as well as by congressional legislation. The rationale of the
1875 grant of federal question jurisdiction - to insure the availability of a forum
designed to minimize the danger of hostility toward, and specially suited to the
vindication of, federally created rights - is as applicable to judicially created
rights as to rights created by statute.
Id at 492 (citations omitted). Accord, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 389 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).
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Despite its refusal to hear the case, the Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee, in an opinion authored by Justice Douglas, expressed its intention to extend federal common law to encompass public nuisances
caused by the pollution of either interstate or navigable waters."
This newly created doctrine was announced by the Court in sweeping terms: "[W]hen we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is federal common law.' '65
The Supreme Court discussed three justifications in support of
its decision that environmental pollution of navigable and interstate
waters constitutes a valid federal common law claim.6 6 First, the
Court pointed out that numerous federal statutes 67 indicate the existence of a substantial federal interest in maintaining the quality of
the nation's interstate and navigable waters. This pervasive federal
concern justifies application of federal common law, even though it is
professed federal policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities of the States in preventing and controlling
water pollution."' 6 1 The Court held that "it is federal, not state, law
that in the end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable
waters." 69 Second, the Court noted that the remedies for water pollution prescribed by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA)70 do not represent the only federal remedies
available.'17 There are instances, as in the present case, when the
relief sought would not be within the precise realm of the solutions
prescribed by Congress. Therefore, an alternative avenue of relief
would be made available through application of federal common law
in addition to the FWPCA.7 1 By acknowledging this alternative
remedy, the Supreme Court intended that the federal nuisance
action fill the gaps in the patchwork of federal and state statutes
governing the control and abatement of water pollution. This
remedy would allow the federal courts to settle water pollution dis-

64. 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972). "The question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable
waters creates actions arising under the 'laws' of the United States within the meaning of
§ 1331(a). We hold that it does; and we also hold that § 1331(a) includes suits brought by a
State." Id
65. Id at 103.
66. Id at 101-07.
67. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 611-668(ee) (1976 & Supp. 1979); Fish
and Wildlife Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 742a, 760e (1976); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. §§ 401-467(e) (1976 & Supp. 1978); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-1175 (1972) (recodified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1979)); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
68. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), Pub. L. No. 80-845, § 1(b), 62 Stat. 1155
(1948) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1978)).
69. 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972).
70. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976 & Supp. 1978)).
71. 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
72. Id at 104.
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putes in conformity with the policies of the existing federal legislation. Finally, the Court implied that the interstate nature of the dispute presented a federal question necessitating resolution by application of federal common law.73 In the past, suits brought by states
concerning apportionment of interstate waters 74 and settlement of
interstate boundaries 75 required the Court to apply federal common
law. 76 Similarly, federal common law could be utilized to settle a dispute between a state and citizens of another state regarding the
pollution of an interstate body of water. In effect, the Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Milwaukee revived the federal interstate common law as
a means of assuring impartial relief in interstate clashes, preserving
the constitutional interest in federalism, and providing for uniform
rules of decision.77
A federal common law nuisance doctrine cloaked in general and
vague terms evolved from Illinois v. Milwaukee. The unanimous
opinion is devoted to delineating the Court's justifications for
fashioning this "specialized" federal law. Just which of the reasons,
or combination of the reasons, is to be controlling or predominant is
uncertain. Some courts have resolved this uncertainty by limiting
application of the federal nuisance cause of action to factual settings
analogous to the one that existed in Illinois v. Milwaukee.7 8 Such an
approach mandates that the suit be initiated by a state, rather than
a private party, against another state or citizens of another state,
that the plaintiff allege pollution of an interstate body of water, and
that the plaintiff show that the effects of the pollution have crossed
state boundaries and have harmed the complaining state. Other
courts have resolved the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's opinion
by interpreting Illinois v. Milwaukee as creating a broad policy doctrine designed to protect the nation's waterways and to abate water
pollution. 9 Thus, the interpretive battle lines have been drawn: one
side views Illinois v. Milwaukee as only indicating when the federal
nuisance doctrine is applicable, while the other side reads the

73. Id at 104-07.
74. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282
U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
75. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
76. 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972). See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92 (1938).
77. 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
78. See e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Parsell
v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd sub nor. East End Yacht Club,
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
79. See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); National Sea
Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert granted, 101 S. Ct. 31
(1980).
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Supreme Court's decision as only indicating why the theory was
created and as leaving the determination of when it is to be applied
in a water pollution controversy up to the individual judges hearing
cases involving a federal common law nuisance claim. Despite these
divergent viewpoints, the Supreme Court's opinion continues to be
the key precedent for the development of the federal common law of
public nuisance in pollution abatement litigation.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL COMMON
LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
One point that clearly emerged from Illinois v. Milwaukee was
that a federal public nuisance claim is a viable cause of action when a
state brings an action against another state or citizens of another
state to abate the pollution of interstate or navigable waters that
originated in the defendant state and has crossed state borders to
affect the complaining state. This narrow result left several key
questions unanswered, 0 including: (1) whether a non-governmental
entity-i.e., a private party-can institute a federal common law
nuisance action; and (2) whether it is essential to a federal common
law nuisance action that an interstate body of water be polluted by
an extraterritorial source. Relying on a narrow interpretation of

80. See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 151 (1977); Glaeser, FederalCommon
Law and Ocean Pollution"A PrivateRemedy for Oil Pollution Damage?, 8 ENV. L. 1,
29-39 [hereinafter cited as Glaeser]. One question previously unanswered was whether
the federal government could avail itself of the federal nuisance cause of action. The issue
is now well settled in the affirmative. See, e.g., United States ex rel Scott v. United States
Steel Corp., 365 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (United States is a permissible plaintiff
because, like the state government, it has a proprietary interest in the water being
polluted, and it has an interest in the development of a uniform standard); United States
v. Stoeco Homes, 359 F. Supp. 672, 679 (D.N.J. 1973) (defendant's construction activities
adversely affecting the navigable waters of the United States constitute an unlawful encroachment upon the public domain, amounting to a public nuisance in violation of federal
common law, and, as such, are subject to abatement at the instance of the government),
vacated on othergrounds, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972) (federal government's interest in water quality
permitted United States to sue at federal common law to abate potential water pollution
caused by corporations engaged in transporting oil across Lake Champlain), 363 F. Supp.
110 (D. Vt.), affd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
The question of whether lesser political subdivisions, ie., municipalities, can bring a
federal nuisance action also has been answered in the affirmative. See, e.g., City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979). In Evansville, the defendant refiner discharged toxic chemicals into a river from which the plaintiffs drew water into their treatment plants. Plaintiffs, as municipal corporations, had to
expend public funds to abate the pollution of an interstate waterway caused by the out-ofstate defendant's discharges. Id at 1010. Municipal and public corporations thus have a
cause of action under the federal common law of nuisance. See also Township of Long
Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978).
One question remaining unanswered is whether the federal common law of public
nuisance cause of action has been preempted by the FWPCA of 1972 and 1977. The
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to consider this issue. City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980). See text accompanying notes 221-255 infra.
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Illinois v. Milwaukee, courts advocating a restrictive approach to
the federal common law of public nuisance have refused to permit
private plaintiffs to institute a federal nuisance action and have
limited application of the nuisance doctrine to suits alleging interstate pollution."' Several recent decisions, dealing squarely with
these issues, however, have interpreted Illinois v. Milwaukee expansively, providing the federal courts with an opportunity to play a
2
more active role in environmental protection.
A. Restricting the Nuisance Doctrine: The Jones Falls Case
The progeny of Illinois v. Milwaukee includes Committee for
the Considerationof the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 3 a significant case for two reasons. First, it is important to Maryland because it expresses the Fourth Circuit's position on the federal common law of public nuisance. Second, and of equal significance, the
Fourth Circuit's holding epitomizes the restrictive view towards application of the federal common law nuisance doctrine.
Jones Falls, a case of first impression for the Fourth Circuit, required the court to determine whether federal nuisance law would be
applicable in a suit brought by private individuals seeking abatement of the polluting of an intrastate body of water. The suit was instituted by a group of private plaintiffs 4 against federal, state, and
local agencies8 5 to enjoin a local sewage treatment plant from dis-

81. See, e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (see text accompanying notes 83-116 infra); Massachusetts v.
United States Veterans Administration, 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co.
v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
82. See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (see text accompanying
notes 155-84 infra); National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir.), cert granted, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (see text accompanying notes 132-54 infra).
83. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976). For other discussions of this case, see Comment, Two Circuits Scuttle Expansion of Federal Common Law, 6 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10256 (1976);
Fourth CircuitReview - FederalCommon Law of Nuisance for Water PollutionAbatement Confined to Interstate Controversies,34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 590 (1977); 18 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 929 (1977); 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549 (1977); 13 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 246 (1977).

84. The plaintiff organizations were the Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Fall
Sewage System, an association comprised of various neighborhood and community
organizations; Cheswolde Neighborhood Association, Inc.; Cross Country Improvement
Associations; and Mt. Washington Improvement Association. Also included were two
individuals who resided in the vicinity of the Jones Falls Stream.
85. Named as defendants were Russell E. Train, EPA Administrator; Neil Solomon, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; F. Pierce Linaweaver,
Director of Baltimore City Department of Public Works; the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore City; C. Elmer Hopper, Jr., Building Engineer for Baltimore County; County
Executive and County Council for Baltimore County; Carl M. Freeman, Trustee, Carl M.
Freeman Associates, Inc.; and Ralph DeChiaro Enterprises, Inc. The last two defendants,
who were applicants for hookups to the sewer system, successfully intervened.
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charging untreated raw sewage into the Jones Falls Stream. After
their initial action had become moot because of the state's compliance with federal law, the plaintiffs amended their original complaint
to include a federal common law nuisance claim.86 The federal district7
court, however, dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that
federal common law nuisance was inapplicable in a suit brought by a
private party alleging only intrastate pollution.8 In effect, the court
narrowed the scope of the principles enunciated in Illinois v. Milwaukee and limited application of the nuisance doctrine to cases with
factual settings similar to the 1972 case.
Writing for the five-judge majority, Judge Haynsworth conceded that some federal common law has evolved since Erie was
decided in 1938.19 He recognized the specialized federal common law
of nuisance "as a necessary expedient" to resolve controversies arising when pollution originating in one state infringes upon the ecological and environmental rights of another state and the affected
state is seeking extraterritorial reliefY° In resolving such an inter-

86. 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976). Initially, the plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin further
sewage discharges into the Jones Falls Stream. Id at 1007. The polluting activities, they
alleged, violated the FWPCA by discharging sewage into Jones Falls without a permit.
Suit was filed on December 5, 1973. It soon became apparent, however, that the plaintiffs
would have no cause of action based on the statute because the Maryland Department of
Public Works on October 9, 1973 had filed a timely and properly supported application to
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a discharge permit issued
pursuant to a provision of the FWPCA, § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976). That section
provides that during the pendency of a timely and properly supported application, interim
discharges shall not be in violation of the statute. It provides a source of immunity from
the time the application is filed until the application's approval is finalized. After the suit
had been filed in the district court, EPA actually issued a permit. 539 F.2d at 1007.
Therefore, the interim discharges were in accordance with the regulatory scheme of the
FWPCA and further discharges were permitted.
87. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 375 F. Supp.
1148, 1153-55 (D. Md. 1974), affad 539 F.2d 1006 (1976). The district court held that
private parties are barred from invoking a federal common law of public nuisance cause of
action. Only governmental entities are proper parties to bring a federal nuisance action.
As there was no proper federal common law count in the present suit, there was no claim
upon which to assert jurisdiction under § 1331(a). Id at 1153. In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted:
Footnote 6 of Justice Douglas' opinion states that "it is not only the character of
the parties that requires us to apply federal common law." This statement can be
read in at least two different ways. It could mean a) that there were other considerations sufficient in themselves to require application of federal law, or b)
that there were other federal interests which in addition to the character of the
parties required the application of federal law although those other interests in
themselves would not have been sufficient. In the view this Court takes of the
basis for the Supreme Court's decision, the latter interpretation is the proper
one.
Id at 1154 n.12 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972)).
88. 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976).
89. Id at 1008.
90. Id
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state dispute, application of the laws of either state would be
inequitable. To avoid this inequity, the court reasoned that the federal common law of public nuisance would be appropriate as "an
acceptable accommodation of state and national interests." 91 The
court added another element to the interstate aspect of the nuisance
doctrine. Relying upon a narrow precedent to support its position,92
the court also required the complaining state to allege an interstate
pollution effect. 93 The interstate character of the controversy, therefore, became twofold: there must not only be an interstate conflict,
but also interstate movement of pollution. In addition to the interstate requirements, the majority determined that only when a state
94
is the party seeking relief may a federal nuisance claim be invoked.
Applying these requirements to the facts in Jones Falls, the
Fourth Circuit found "neither the reason nor the necessity for the invocation of a body of federal common law." 9-5 Instead, the court
found only an intrastate pollution effect in this local controversy between state and local public officials and Maryland citizens, which
could be settled by applying Maryland law.9 The Fourth Circuit majority observed that to the extent there is a federal interest in the
controversy, it does not reach beyond that expressed in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). In Jones Falls, however, the
97
plaintiffs had no claim based upon the federal statute.
The court also noted that the FWPCA foreclosed a federal common law claim.9 8 Pollutants emanating from the sewage treatment
plant were being discharged into the Jones Falls Stream pursuant to
a permit authorized by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).9 The action sought to be enjoined was therefore in
accordance with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court
concluded that "it would be an anomaly to hold that there was a
body of federal common law which proscribes conduct which the
1972 Act of Congress legitimates."100 In essence, the Jones Falls ma-

91. Id at 1008-09. Apparently, the state interest referred to is the quasi-sovereign right to a
pollution-free environment, and the national interest referred to is the preservation of the
concept of federalism.
92. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520-22 (8th Cir. 1975). The only reference in
Reserve Mining to an interstate requirement was the following statement: "As formulated in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ...and Texas v. Pankey ...federal nuisance law
contemplates, at a minimum, interstate pollution of air or water." Id at 520 (citations
omitted).
93. 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976).
94. Id at 1009, 1010.
95. Id at 1009.
96. Id
97. Id at 1009-10.
98. Id
99. Id The FWPCA, § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. 1978), establishes a permit program to authorize controlled pollution discharges.
100. 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976).
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jority determined that the FWPCA preempted a remedy formulated
under the federal nuisance doctrine in order to avoid displacing federal statutory law with federal judge-made law.
The Fourth Circuit's decision stemmed from the court's view
that the federal public nuisance law created by the Supreme Court
was rooted in a constitutional interest in preserving the federal system. The court interpreted Illinois v. Milwaukee as indicating that
the right to an environment free of pollution emanating from an outof-state source is a quasi-sovereign interest belonging only to the
states. Therefore, only a state can vindicate this right when it has
been infringed upon by the effects of extraterritorial pollution. The
characterization of the state as plaintiff thus was a prerequisite to a
federal nuisance action. Reinforcing this view is the FWPCA's policy
of rendering priority to the states to control and abate water pollution.10' To allow federal nuisance suits to be brought by parties other
than states would contradict this express federal policy recognizing
the preeminence of state authority in pollution control. 102 Additionally, if private plaintiffs were entitled to bring an action against
state and local governmental entities, this policy would be
frustrated. Finally, protection of a state's quasi-sovereign interest
from encroachment by extraterritorial pollution necessitates application of federal nuisance law to accommodate the pervasive interest in
federalism. This state interest would be preserved best by requiring
the federal courts to be the forum to resolve interstate litigation involving conflicting states' interests.
A well reasoned three-judge dissent, written by Judge Butzner,
pointed out that the Supreme Court molded the nuisance doctrine to
effectuate the federal policy of abating pollution of the nation's interstate and navigable waterways. 0 3 This broad policy is evidenced in
federal statutes dealing with the country's natural resources and in
°4
state legislation compatible with these congressional mandates.
The federal common law of public nuisance, the dissent asserted, was
fashioned to fill the statutory interstices of the FWPCA and to provide for uniform federal rules of decision in water pollution cases."'5

101. This policy is expressed in § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1978), which provides in
part:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,
to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.
102. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006,
1009 (4th Cir. 1976).
103. Id at 1013 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
104. Id
105. Id
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The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that a state is the
only proper plaintiff entitled to bring an action under federal common law and noted the Supreme Court's caution against confusing
parties with the subject matter of the action: "[Ilt is not only the
character of the parties that requires us to apply federal law....
[W]here there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal common law.' 10 6 Judge
Butzner asserted that the pollution of interstate or navigable waters
presents a federal question. The nature of the controversy, rather
than the characterization of the state as plaintiff, invokes jurisdiction in the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).'0 7 The
dissent buttressed this argument by citing the citizen suit section of
the FWPCA 08° These provisions emphasize the federal nature of a
citizen's action by granting a citizen the right to sue in federal court
without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy. Moreover, the citizen suit provisions preserve common law
remedies available to a plaintiff in addition to the relief prescribed in
the statute. The dissent determined that the term "common law," as
used in the citizen suit section, did not refer exclusively to state common law or preclude application of federal common law. °9 As the dis-

106. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
107. 539 F.2d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
108. Id at 1011-13. The citizen suit provision is found at § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976), and
provides in part:
(a)... any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
(e) Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator or a State agency).
(g) For the purpose of this section the term "citizen" means a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.
109. 539 F.2d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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sent concluded, these provisions demonstrate "that Congress recognized that the pollution of navigable waters and their tributaries
raises a federal question for which all federal law, including common
law, is applicable." 10
The dissent also rejected the limitation of federal common law to
protection of only interstate bodies of water. Based on the expansive
definition given navigable waters under the FWPCA, 1" the legislative history of the Act,"12 and federal regulations promulgated by the
EPA,"3 the dissent concluded that the Jones Falls was a navigable
body of water." 4 Relying upon Justice Douglas' broad language in
Illinois v. Milwaukee that the federal common law of nuisance
would protect both interstate and navigable waters," 5 Judge Butzner argued that the scope of federal common law of public nuisance
should be extended to include pollution of intrastate waters." 6
Illinois v. Milwaukee was not the only source supporting this conclusion. Because federal common law draws its substance from federal
statutory law, the expansion of the Act's coverage under the 1972
FWPCA amendments to include tributaries of navigable waters justifies extending federal common law protection to these
tributaries. ' 7 Important, too, was the fact that Jones Falls flows
into the Patapsco River, which eventually empties into the
Chesapeake Bay, one of the nation's most valuable maritime
resources."18 The dissent found it unreasonable to assume that Congress could have expected all the water in the Bay to be recycled
through treatment works to remove all the pollutants found in the
Bay." 9 Moreover, it was unreasonable to expect persons affected by
pollution of the Bay to trace the source of the pollution to one of the

110. Id But see 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 929, 948-49 (1977).
111. The statutory definition is found in the FWPCA at § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976), and
provides that "Itihe term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."
112. See S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in 11972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3776, 3882, in which the conferees stated that they "fully intend that the
term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes."
113. The regulatory definition is found at 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(p)(2) (1975) (recodified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.3(t) (1979)1.
114. 539 F.2d 1006, 1011 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
115. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972).
116. 539 F.2d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
117. Id The dissent, however, cited no statutory provisions expressly extending coverage to
tributaries of interstate and navigable waters. The dissent may have interpreted the term
navigable waters to encompass tributaries.
118. Id at 1011. Judge Butzner emphasized the need to protect the Chesapeake Bay, the body
of water ultimately affected by the polluting of the Jones Falls Stream system. This is
best achieved by preventing discharges of pollutants into the Bay's tributaries. Id at
1011-12.
119. Id
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numerous tributaries draining into this large body of water. The dissent noted that all these factors inevitably indicated that "the national interest in making the navigable waters of the United States
wholesome and clean involves Jones Falls, even though Baltimore's
sewage also has an intrastate effect on people who live near the
stream.' ' 20 As the dissent's pronouncements suggest, the interstate
effect or the interstate character of the body of water are irrelevant
when considering application of the federal common law of public
nuisance to protect the nation's waterways.
The decision of the Jones Falls majority is subject to several
criticisms. Most significantly, the court failed to consider alternative
interpretations of Illinois v. Milwaukee and to examine more carefully the federal concern and policy toward the country's waters. By
stressing the states' role in water pollution abatement, the Fourth
Circuit circumvented the Supreme Court's directive that federal, not
state, law predominates in anti-pollution efforts to protect interstate
and navigable waters.' 2 1 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit ignored the
Supreme Court's language that suggested that the overriding interest in federalism and the need for a uniform rule of decision require
invocation of federal common law, even when a state is not the plaintiff in a federal common law action.'22 Furthermore, the court erroneously stated that the federal nuisance law up to the time of Jones
Falls never had been extended to controversies with parties other
than states as plaintiffs 123 or to actions alleging water pollution with
no interstate effect.' 24 By determining that the FWPCA represents
the ceiling of federal interest in controlling pollution of the nation's
waters, the court in Jones Falls sidestepped Justice Douglas' intent
to preserve federal common law actions in order to supplement congressional remedies to abate water pollution.'2 5

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id at 1012.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972).
Id at 105 n.6.
539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976). See Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (D.
Conn. 1976) (though not addressing the issue directly, the court suggested that the federal
nuisance action be extended to private plaintiffs, but even if it is, it should "be limited to
suits involving pollution with an impact on more than one state"), affd sub nor. East
End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir.), cert denied 434 U.S. 969
(1977); Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court
assumed jurisdiction over a suit brought by an environmental group, which also had a
river as a plaintiff). The court in Jones Fals did suggest that perhaps the federal government could bring a federal common law nuisance action. 539 F.2d at 1009. See note 80
supra.
124. 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1976). See, e.g., United States ex rel Scott v. United States Steel
Corp., 365 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill.
1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972), 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.), affd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir.
1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
125. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972). As Douglas stated, "[t]he remedies
which Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available." Id
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Despite its shortcomings, Jones Falls remains intact as Fourth
Circuit law.126 Two other federal courts of appeals, however, have
reached different conclusions with respect to two of the requirements the Fourth Circuit found essential to instituting a federal
common law nuisance suit: the characterization of the plaintiff as a
state 27 and the need to allege the pollution of an interstate body of

water. 128
B.

Expanding the Scope of the FederalNuisance Doctrine

1.

Private Plaintiffs: The Sea Clammers Case

The character of the plaintiff in a federal common law nuisance
action has been the subject of much discussion.' 9 In the past, the
courts have been reluctant to extend the federal nuisance cause of
action to private parties,3 0 though some progress has been made.",
In the actions that were initiated by private plaintiffs, the courts
usually dismissed the suits, relying on precedent rather than on a
reasoned opinion justifying why these parties should be barred. The
1980 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in NationalSea Clammers Association v. City of New York'32
marks the first instance in which a federal court has directly extended the federal nuisance action to private parties.
The plaintiffs in Sea Clarnmers, an association whose members'
livelihood depends on harvesting fish and shellfish from the waters
and sea beds of the Atlantic Ocean near New Jersey and New York,
33
filed suit against federal, state, and local environmental agencies.'
The association's complaint alleged that the defendants discharged
or permitted to be discharged sewage and toxic waste into the ocean

126. See e.g., Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443, 445 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th
Cir. 1976)).
127. See National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980).
128. See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
129. See e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Glaeser, supra note 80; Comment, Federal Common Law of
Nuisance Reaches New High Water Mark as Supreme Court Considers Illinois v.
Milwaukee II, 10 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10101, 10101-03 [hereinafter cited as Comment];
18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 929 (1977); 26 EMORY L.J. 433 (1977); 13 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 246 (1977).
130. See e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Sevanda, Inc. v. Irwin, 10 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (Envir. Rep.
Cases) 2065 (D. Ga. 1976).
131. See note 123 supra (courts indicating that private parties could bring federal common law
nuisance actions). See also note 80 supra (federal government and municipalities as plaintiffs in federal nuisance suits).
132. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert grante4 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980).
133. Id at 1224.
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or its tributaries which led to the uncommon, rapid growth of algae
in these waters.14 When the algae died and decomposed, an oxygen
deficiency was created in the water near the ocean floor. As a result,
much of the marine life, particularly shellfish, died because they were
unable to flee the afflicted area.
The National Sea Clammers Association included in their complaint a federal common law nuisance claim. Although the federal
district court dismissed all the federal counts, 135 the Third Circuit
reversed, summarily holding that "the common law nuisance remedy
recognized in Illinois v. Milwaukee is available in suits by private
parties.'

136

In arriving at its decision, the court cited the broad

language of the Supreme Court indicating that the character of the
parties in a federal common law action was not the sole requisite factor for creating a federal nuisance remedy. 137 The Third Circuit relied
primarily upon the "overriding federal interest in the need for a
uniform rule of decision '1

38

as the rationale for fashioning a federal

common law to abate water pollution.1 39 In Sea Clammers, the plaintiffs were suing for damages to interstate ambient water. The court
concluded that this presented an issue "as to which there is a clear
and overriding federal interest in uniformity,' ' 4 0 thus necessitating

application of federal nuisance law. Moreover, relegating the parties
to the conflicting nuisance standards applied by the state courts
"would ignore the clear intent of the Supreme Court to federalize
those standards and would undermine that federal uniformity."14 In
addition, the court stated that private plaintiffs should not only be
permitted to bring federal common law nuisance actions, but should
be encouraged to participate in the abatement of such nuisances in
order to give full
effect to the nuisance doctrine fashioned in Illinois
2
v. Milwaukee.1

The unanimous Third Circuit decision in Sea Clammers recognized various independent justifications for establishing the federal
common law of public nuisance, contravening the Fourth Circuit's
emphasis in Jones Falls on the quasi-sovereign rights of states and
the need to provide a federal forum in interstate disputes to preserve
the pervasive interest in federalism. 43 Illinois v. Milwaukee'44 was

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id at 1224-25.
Id at 1225.
Id at 1233.
Id
Id (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972)).
616 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir.), cert granted, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980).
Id
Id at 1233-34.
Id at 1234.
Conunittee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006,
1008-10 (4th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
144. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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the basis of the Fourth Circuit's position that a private party should
not be permitted to initiate a federal nuisance action. The Supreme
Court had permitted Illinois to maintain an action at common law by
relying upon Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 145 and Texas v.
Pankey.14 6 Both of these earlier cases depended upon the environmental-based state interest and the existence of an extraterritorial
pollution effect to substantiate their holdings. By relying upon those
decisions, the Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Milwaukee, indicated it
attributed some weight to the characterization of the state as plaintiff in determining whether the invocation of federal common law
would be appropriate in a water pollution case.
There were additional reasons enunciated in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, however, for invoking federal common law. 47 Although
these reasons were virtually ignored by the Fourth Circuit, the
rationale employed by the Third Circuit was that the federal common law nuisance doctrine is applicable in cases alleging pollution of
interstate and navigable waters to preserve uniformity of federal
decisional rules.1 48 The Third Circuit also implied that the federal
interest in preserving the purity and quality of the nation's waters
required invocation of the federal nuisance law. This is apparent
from the court's references throughout its opinion to the need for
149
applying federal common law when interstate waters are affected.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

206 U.S. 230 (1907).
441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972). See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra.
616 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir.), cert. grante4 100 S. Ct. 314 (1980).
Id at 1224-25, 1233-34. "In the instant case, plaintiffs are suing for damages to interstate ambient waters, an issue as to which there is a clear and overriding federal interest in uniformity." Id at 1233.
Although the court's holding indicated that the federal interest in interstate waters is
one of the reasons for invoking the federal common law of nuisance, the court's decision
could be interpreted as an extension of the federal nuisance cause of action to private
parties only when there is an interstateeffect alleged. The Third Circuit spoke in terms of
the "interstate pollution" being asserted in the suit. Id In addition, the court noted that
failure to allege an interstate effect in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1975) and in Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) "proved fatal to plaintiffs seeking to base their suits on the
federal common law nuisance remedy," 616 F.2d at 1234 n.35, and that the issue of concern in Illinois v. Milwaukee "was the need to apply uniform federal law where polluting
activities of one state caused harm to another state." Id
On the other hand, the court also noted that in Illinois v. Milwaukee "a unanimous
Supreme Court recognized that there is a federal common law cause of action to abate pollution of interstate ambient water, notwithstanding the relief available under FWPCAA."
Id at 1230 n.21. Moreover, when discussing the National Sea Clammers Association's
claim, the court stated that they have "sufficiently alleged pollution of interstate waters."
Id at 1234 (emphasis added). Furthermore, nowhere in the description of the facts did the
court point to an allegation of pollution having an extraterritorial effect. Rather, the court
stated that the plaintiff's complaint only asserted damage to the Atlantic Ocean and its
tributaries and the sea life within the water. Id at 1224-25. Apparently, the court used
the term pollution of interstate waters interchangeably with the term interstate pollution.
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The National Sea Clammers Association alleged pollution of the
Atlantic Ocean, clearly an interstate body of water. Under these circumstances, application of the federal nuisance cause of action is
appropriate to further an articulated federal concern to protect valuable water resources and to promote uniform decisional rules in
water pollution cases. When combined, these goals form a strong
argument in favor of federal nuisance suits brought by private attorneys general to protect water resources from the devastating effects
of pollution.
Other sources support the Third Circuit's conclusion that
private plaintiffs are entitled to bring a federal common law nuisance
action. In Jones Falls, the dissent argued that the FWPCA's citizen
suit provisions5 ° reserve a private individual's right to sue on his
own behalf to abate water pollution and preserve federal common
law remedies as a means of relief. 5 1 Additionally, when a controversy
crosses state borders, the interstate nature of the dispute transcends
the jurisdiction of any state court and mandates the application of
federal law, as evidenced in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 152 and
Texas v. Pankey.153 The application of federal common law in interstate water pollution suits, therefore, should not be confined to
actions initiated by a state. Justice Douglas in Illinois v. Milwaukee
suggested this conclusion by focusing on the nature of the dispute
rather than the character of the parties involved.154 When combined
with the pervasive federal interest in abating and controlling water
pollution, the need to use federal common law cannot be denied, even
in actions instituted by private plaintiffs.
Two other considerations must also be addressed in the context
of the right of private plaintiffs in interstate controversies. If a
private party is denied the right to assert a federal common law
public nuisance claim, a plaintiff in one state injured by pollution
originating in another state may be subjected to the laws and the
courts of the state from which the nuisance emanated. Moreover, if
the state court were the only available forum for relief, an injured
individual may be confronted with the problem of having an extraterritorial injunctive decree enforced. By expanding access to the
federal courts to private parties asserting a federal nuisance claim,
these inequitable results can be avoided.

150. § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976); see text accompanying notes 108-10 supra
151. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006,
1010-14 (4th Cir. 1976). (Butzner, J., dissenting).
152. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
153. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
154. 401 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
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2.

Pollution of Intrastate Navigable Waters: The OutboardMarine
Case
Just as the Third Circuit broadened the scope of the nuisance
doctrine to encompass private plaintiffs, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Illinois v. Outboard Marine
55
Corp.,'1
enlarged the scope of the nuisance doctrine by permitting a
federal common law public nuisance action in cases involving the
pollution of an intrastate navigable body of water. In Outboard
Marine, the State of Illinois brought an action complaining of the
defendant's discharges of toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
from a plant within Illinois into Lake Michigan and its tributaries.156
The state alleged that the PCBs caused environmental damage to
the waters and endangered the health and welfare of Illinois'
citizens. 157 Federal common law of public nuisance was the basis of
one cause of action in the suit.158 The federal district court, however,
dismissed the federal common law count for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.1 59 Based on a narrow interpretation of Illinois v. Milwaukee, the district court concluded that there
could be no federal common law cause of action because no interstate
conflict or interstate pollution effect existed.1 60 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court and allowed a federal
nuisance action even though the pollution was intrastate in nature
and the suit was between a state and its own citizens.

155. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
156. Id at 624.
157. Id The complaint sought an injunction to restrain Outboard Marine Corp. (O.M.C.) from
further discharging PCBs from the Waukegan, Illinois plant, a mandatory injunction directing O.M.C. to study removal and disposal methods for the accumulated PCB-contaminated sediments, a mandatory injunction directing O.M.C. to remove and dispose of
the PCB-contaminated sediments in North Ditch, Waukegan Harbor and Lake Michigan,
and a similar injunction requiring removal of PCB-contaminated soil. The complaint also
asked for civil penalties. Id
158. Id The state also sued under the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1978),
and raised several pendant state claims based on the Illinois Public Nuisance Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 1001/2, §§ 1-29 (Smith-Hurd 1934 & Supp. 1980-1981), the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112, §§ 1001-1007.1 (Smith-Hurd
1977 & Supp. 1980-1981), the Illinois common law of nuisance, and the Illinois common
law of trespass. 619 F.2d 623, 624 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1980).
159. 619 F.2d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 1980). Prior to the district court's disposition of the suit, the
federal government filed an action in the same court against O.M.C., alleging the same
PCB pollution effects of the same three bodies of water. The suit was brought under the
Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970), and under the federal common law of public nuisance.
619 F.2d at 624. After Illinois' suit was dismissed, the Attorney General for Illinois filed a
motion to intervene in the suit brought by the federal government. The federal district
court judge, however, denied the motion for leave to intervene. It was from this order, and
from the original dismissal order of Illinois' own action, that Illinois brought an appeal. Id
160. 619 F.2d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 1980).
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In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit focused upon the
overriding federal interest in the nation's interstate and navigable
waters and in the development of programs designed to prevent pollution of these natural resources. ' The court concluded that it was
these significant federal concerns, evident in the FWPCA, that initially prompted the Supreme Court to create the federal nuisance
doctrine.' 62 The purpose of applying federal nuisance law was "to fill
the statutory interstices and to provide uniformity in controlling
water pollution in either interstate or navigable waters of the United

States."163
Integral to the court's ruling was its determination that the
nuisance doctrine does not apply exclusively to interstate bodies of
water, but also encompasses intrastate navigable waters. 164 This
comports with Justice Douglas' language extending federal common
law to protect "interstate or navigable waters."'165 Moreover, the concept of navigability has taken on new dimensions as the federal interest in navigable waters now extends beyond the commercial sense to
include the purity and quality of waters. 166 The FWPCA expressly
encompasses navigable, as well as interstate, waters under its protective shield.' 67 Following its own directive to look to the Act for
guidance in applying the federal common law of public nuisance in
water pollution cases,'16 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
nuisance action should extend to protect an intrastate navigable
69
body of water.'
The court noted the irrelevancy of whether the pollution affecting navigable or interstate waters originates from within a state or

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id at 626.
Id
Id at 630.
Id at 626-30.
Id at 626 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972)) (emphasis added).
619 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit derived the broad definition of
"navigable waters" from the Supreme Court's use of the term in Illinois v. Milwaukee
and
also from the legislative history of the FWPCA and EPA regulations defining the term.
Id at 626-27. See notes 112-13 supra.
167. See, e.g., § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976). This section states: "[Ilt
is the national
goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;...
Id (emphasis added).
168. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979), cert grante4 100 S. Ct.
1310 (1980). "In applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollution case, a
court should not ignore the Act but should look to its policies and principles for
guidance." Id Apparently, the Seventh Circuit was acting under the direction of the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Supreme Court
noted that "[wihile the various federal environmental protection statutes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision." Id at 103 n.5. Accorx4 Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
169. 619 F.2d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1980).
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from an extraterritorial source. 170 Interstate effect may inevitably
occur, 17 1 but that factor cannot obscure the pervasive federal concern
in protecting the quality and purity of the nation's interstate and
navigable waters. The court concluded that:
It is keeping therefore with the national program of protecting federal waters for the states to be allowed to sue one
who has committed the federal tort of polluting federal
waters within the state or on which the state borders. The
applicable
law, however, is federal and it should be
7
uniform. 1
The language of the Seventh Circuit indicates the desirability of
uniform legal standards in water pollution cases as another goal
encouraging the growth of federal common law nuisance. Several
provisions of the FWPCA evidence the national policy favoring uniformity. These provisions include the section establishing national
goals for eliminating pollution,1 73 the section allowing for state
enforcement if the state's standards comply with federal
regulations,174 the section permitting the EPA Administrator to
enforce pollution limitations if a state fails to do so, 175 and the section
providing that no state standard may be less stringent than the fed176
eral regulations.
Not only did the court reject the position that a federal common
law action requires that an interstate effect be alleged and an interstate body of water be polluted, but the Seventh Circuit also rejected
the requirement that the nature of the dispute be interstate. The
court asserted that "[tihere is no basis for putting a gloss on the
Supreme Court holding that would restrict its application to situations in which one state complains of damages to its environment or
ecology by a pollution source in another state.' ' 77 To support this
conclusion, the court developed several unique policy considerations
that justify expanding the nuisance doctrine to encompass an intrastate dispute. 78 First, when pollution of interstate waters emanates
from two sources, one in-state and one out-of-state, a single suit in
federal court under federal common law would eliminate the poten-

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id at 627.
Id at 628. In the court's own words: "Fish swim." Id
Id
§ 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
§ 306(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (1976).
§ 309(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2) (Supp. 1978).
§ 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). Although not citing it, § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp.
1978), providing for the promulgation of pollution guidelines also supports the court's
finding of the desirability of uniform legal standards.
177. 619 F.2d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1980).
178. Id at 629-30.
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tial of each polluter hiding behind the coattails of the other polluter
by claiming that the other is the contributor of the most harmful
effects. 79 Without the opportunity to institute a federal common law
action, the affected party would be forced to file two suits - one in
state court and one in federal court - which would provide fertile
ground for such evasive maneuvers by the polluters. Second, a single
action would promote economy of judicial administration and uniformity in result. 180 By allowing a single suit, a state could join with
the federal government, as in the present case, to prevent pollution
in that state. If consolidation into a single federal suit were not an
option, multiple actions may end in contradictory results and require
further litigation to reconcile the inconsistencies. Finally, permitting
a state to sue in federal court would ensure that pollution controls
would not be ignored by states eager to expand industrial development. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "if ...a state sues in federal court and aids in development of a comprehensive federal law of
nuisance, the law can be enforced against polluters no matter where
the pollution originates."""8 If a state must stand alone and develop
its own strong common law of nuisance, this could lead to a mass
exodus by industry to a less restrictive state and result in an unjust
18 2
imbalance in the economic growth of the states.
Although the plaintiff in Illinois v. OutboardMarine Corp. was a
state and in several instances the court referred to a state's right to
bring a federal common law action,' 3 the court's holding could be
extended to apply equally to an action filed by a private plaintiff.
The Seventh Circuit accepted the limited role to be afforded states as
plaintiffs, noting the Supreme Court's reliance in Illinois v.
Milwaukee on the characterization of the state as plaintiff as only
one criterion determinative of the applicability of the nuisance doctrine.8 4 Additionally, two of the policy considerations raised by the
Seventh Circuit in favor of federal common law actions are equally
persuasive when the party instituting a federal nuisance action is a
private party rather than a state. Preventing multiple pollution
sources from having the opportunity to hide behind each other in
multiple pollution suits in both federal and state courts, as well as
providing for more efficient use of the judiciary and for more uniform
court decisions, are worthwhile goals regardless of who the plaintiff

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 629.
at 630.
at 627-29.
at 626. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
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is in the federal nuisance action. In light of the Seventh Circuit's
general intent to expand the scope of the nuisance doctrine, and the
court's recognition that the federal interest in preserving the quality
of the nation's waters is the primary reason for the federal common
law of nuisance, it would be anomalous to interpret the court's
holding as limiting access to federal common law nuisance actions to
states only.
IV. POTENTIAL RESTRAINTS
The recent Third and Seventh Circuit decisions clearly indicate
the continuing role of the federal courts in the development of the
federal common law of public nuisance. These circuits convincingly
rebut the artificial barriers erected by those courts advocating a
restrictive application of this federal cause of action. 8 5 At the present time, the Third and Seventh Circuits, "in their apparent rivalry
to expand the limits of federal nuisance to the maximum permitted
under Illinois, appear to be of the view that its reach is bounded only
186
by the limitations on federal power under the Commerce Clause.
Nevertheless, several procedural and substantive restrictions exist
which could impede the use of the federal common law nuisance doctrine in water pollution disputes.
A.

Standing to Sue

It is beyond question that the federal courts have jurisdiction to
hear federal common law public nuisance suits.' 7 The question of
whether a party can maintain an action in federal court, however,
still must be analyzed in terms of the plaintiff's standing. Under the
doctrine of parens patriae, a state is obligated to protect the health,
welfare, and safety of its citizens or to prevent harm to state property.'8 8 When the pollution of an interstate or navigable body of
water is affecting a state's citizens, whether the pollution is caused
by one of the state's own citizens'8 9 or by a source in another state,19
a state will have standing to sue as parens patriae. In the interstate
pollution context, a state's standing to sue under a federal common
law claim has been described in terms of the state's right to pro-

185. See, e.g., Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Administration, 514
F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
186. Comment, supra note 129, at 10104.
187. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1971).
188. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4047 (1973).
189. See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
190. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
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in an environment free of extratect its quasi-sovereign interest
1 91
territorial pollution effects.

Private plaintiffs face a greater burden in establishing standing
to sue in federal court in a federal nuisance action. To demonstrate
that he has the requisite personal stake in the litigation,'92 a private
plaintiff must show a concrete injury, either threatened or immediate, as a result of the defendant's alleged illegal action. 93 A private
plaintiff must assert, therefore, that the pollution of the interstate or
navigable water directly affects, 94 for example, his drinking water,
the water he enjoys for recreational purposes, or the water in which
he fishes to sustain his livelihood. 9 Additionally, the plaintiff must
prove a causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's alleged injury'9 6 or, in the alternative,' 97 that the court's
98
remedial powers would effectively redress the plaintiff's harm.

Frequently in environmental litigation, the plaintiff maintaining
the suit is an environmental association. It is uncontroverted that an
association may have standing to vindicate whatever rights the
organization itself may enjoy,191 as well as the rights of its individual
members. 200 When an organization is acting solely as a representa-

tive of its members, it must demonstrate an injury directly affecting
its members, or any one of them, as opposed to an injury suffered by
the public in general. 20' It is therefore necessary for the association to

191. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1971).
192. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), in which the court stated:
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing. It is, of course,
a question of federal law.
Id The standing requirement is derived from the case or controversy clause of art. III, §
2, cL 1 of the Constitution.
193. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973).
194. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
195. Analogous to the standing requirement mandating that the plaintiff allege an injury in
fact is the need for a plaintiff in a federal common law nuisance action to demonstrate that
the defendant is carrying on an activity that is causing a direct harm to a "cognizable interest" enjoyed by the complainant. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165
(7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980). Accord, District of Columbia v.
Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (plaintiff, District of Columbia, failed to demonstrate any harm to a cognizable interest resulting from the effluent discharges by a Maryland waste water treatment plant into the Rock Creek Stream, a body of water shared by
both the District and Maryland). This requirement is relevant to the question of proximate causation. Id at 864.
196. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
197. See Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
198. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
199. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
200. See id; National Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963).
201. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
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satisfy the same standing requirements as an individual. To overcome this burden, the environmental organization must demonstrate
that one or more of its members use or enjoy the affected water
resource. In addition, the interests the organization is seeking to protect must be germane to the group's purpose and neither the claim
asserted nor the type of relief sought may require the participation
of individual members in the litigation.0 2
Whether a plaintiff can maintain a federal nuisance action
depends on his standing to have the court decide the merits of the
federal nuisance claim. A state will have minimal difficulties in
establishing standing to sue, but a private party, whether an individual or an organization, may be unable to satisfy the preliminary
standing requirements. Therefore, even in those circuits recognizing
a private party's right to bring a federal common law action to abate
water pollution, a private plaintiff still may be precluded from suing
under the federal nuisance doctrine.
B.

Sovereign Immunity

Another potential bar to a federal common law action initiated
by private plaintiffs is the eleventh amendment. 20 3 Pursuant to the
eleventh amendment, states are immune from suits in federal court
brought by citizens of another state.2 4 The immunity granted by the
amendment extends to a suit in federal court by a private party
against its own state.20 5 Therefore, whether a private party is suing
his own state to control the pollution of an intrastate body of water
or suing another state to abate an interstate pollution effect, he will
be barred from relief under a federal common law nuisance action by
virtue of the eleventh amendment.
As an alternative course of action when a state is the defendant,
a private party may bring an action in state, rather than federal,
court. The eleventh amendment does not prohibit suits instituted
against a state in the courts of another state. 201 If the plaintiff brings
a suit in the courts of his own state or in the courts of the state where
the pollution originated, he may be faced with the prospect of having
the public nuisance analyzed under state common law principles.

202. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975).
203. The eleventh amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
204. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
205. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
206. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (the eleventh amendment is merely a limitation on
the judicial power of the United States).
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This would contravene the intent of the Supreme Court in Illinois v.
07
Milwaukee to apply a uniform federal nuisance standard.
Moreover, if the injured individual is successful in his action in the
court of the polluting state, he may be confronted with the problem
of having an extraterritorial injunctive decree enforced.
To avoid the immunity of the eleventh amendment, a private
plaintiff may choose to bring suit in federal court against the appropriate state officer." 8 The amendment does not grant state officials
immunity from federal claims when sued in their official capacities.20 9
For example, a suit may be brought against the state officer or
agency head charged with overseeing the operations of a waste treatment plant that discharges pollutants into an interstate or navigable
body of water. Similarly, independent political subdivisions of a
state also possess no immunity under the eleventh amendment.210
When the proper nexus can be shown between a municipality and
alleged water pollution, as where the pollution is emanating from a
municipal waste treatment plant, the governmental entity may be
sued in federal court by a private party based on a federal common
law public nuisance claim. The defense of sovereign immunity,
therefore, may not pose as serious a barrier as first appears.
C.

Suits in Equity

The nature of the relief available in a federal nuisance suit may
present a potential constraint to a federal common law nuisance
action. The Supreme Court determined in Illinois v. Milwaukee that
federal common law suits "will be equity suits in which the informed
judgment of the chancellor will largely govern." ' Although the
relief contemplated by the Court requires federal judges to fashion a
remedy by balancing the equities, the Court did not intend for the
lower courts to be restricted to the traditional common law nuisance
concepts when weighing the relevant factors and therefore refrained

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 rL6 (1972).
See Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133
U.S. 529 (1890).
211. 406 U.S. 91,108 (1972). But see City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604
F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979). In Evansville, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs had
adequately stated a federal common law nuisance claim for monetary damages. For a
discussion of the case, see Comment, Seventh Circuit InterpretsFederal Common Law of
Nuisance to Authorize Municipalities to Sue for Damages,9 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10168
(1979).
207.
208.
209.
210.
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from any discussion of the specific elements of the tort of nuisance.2"2
On the contrary, a case-by-case approach was advocated, because
"[tihere are no fixed rules that govern,"2 3' and "the applicable federal
common law depends upon the facts peculiar to the particular
case.''

214

In light of the equitable nature of such suits, the courts must
balance the relative harm a defendant will suffer in relation to the
benefits bestowed upon a plaintiff if successful in his action. 2 1 A
defendant's conduct pursuant to the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, his value to the community, and the economic
impact upon the polluter to further abate the pollution are all examples of the factors to be considered by the courts. When weighed
against the potential benefits to a plaintiff, especially if the harm
only affects a private party, the court may be persuaded to decide in
favor of the defendant after reviewing all the circumstances.
The plaintiff in a federal common law nuisance action may be
faced with substantial evidentiary burdens. He must establish the
existence of the public nuisance and its adverse effects on a
cognizable interest he enjoys. 2 6 In addition, the complainant must
demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief sought and that the relief
is an appropriate means to remedy the pollution effects.2 7 The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee IP1 suggested that proving the existence of an actual nuisance may be demonstrated with relative ease by showing the harmful effects of the
pollution.2' 9 Nevertheless, a more difficult task may be establishing,
under the balancing of the equities, that a specific remedy would be

212. 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972). It is worth noting that nowhere in its opinion did the Supreme
Court instruct the federal courts to define the substantive elements of public nuisance in
accord with state common law public nuisance requirements or the principles enunciated
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
For a case discussing the state public nuisance requirements in Maryland, see Adams v.
Commissioners of Town of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954).
213. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
214. Id at 106.
215. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S.
Ct. 1310 (1980); Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963). See
generally R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 244-47 (1978); C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942 (1973). While the deter-

216.
217.
218.
219.

mination of whether to issue an injunction generally involves a balancing of the equities,
the balance is of less importance when the plaintiff is a sovereign entity. See Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). When the pollution is endangering the public
health, injunctive relief is proper without resorting to any balancing analysis. See Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310
(1980); Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredder Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1976).
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165, 167-69 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310
(1980).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165-67, 169-77 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980).
599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980). See note 6 supra.
Id at 167-69.
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appropriate. As in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee II, the effect of a
remedy requiring invocation of more stringent effluent limitations
than those currently in force presented the plaintiffs with an evidentiary burden they were unable to sustain.2 0
D. Preemption
Perhaps the most significant restraint to the federal common
law of nuisance is the possibility that it may be preempted by federal
legislative or administrative action. The Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Milwaukee recognized the potential effect of such governmental
action.22' Until preemption comes to pass, however, the Court
emphasized the need for a federal nuisance action as an alternative
source of relief and established in the federal courts the power to
appraise the equities of suits
alleging the creation of a public
222
nuisance by water pollution.

The Supreme Court adopted a narrow view towards the general
preemptive effect of the pervasive legislation existing in the area of
water pollution. This is clear from the Court's creation of the federal
common law nuisance action. Further evidence of the Court's view is
found in its justifications for fashioning federal common law. 223 The

Court intended to fill statutory interstices in the existing legislative
scheme and to provide a viable remedy when the relief sought is not
within the scope of existing statutory remedies.
Not only does the federal legislation, the FWPCA in particular,
fail to preempt federal common law nuisance actions, but in fact it
provides for such a means of relief from water pollution. The argument proffered by Judge Butzner in his Jones Falls dissent, 224 that
federal common law relief was retained explicitly under the language
of the savings clause to the citizen suit provisions of the FWPCA, 225
emphasizes this point. The savings clause preserves a person's right
to relief under common law remedies. Nothing in the legislative history of the FWPCA reveals that Congress intended to limit the term
"common law" in this provision to state common law or to exclude
federal common law remedies.
Although on its face the FWPCA has not preempted federal
common law nuisance actions, it is crucial to determine whether compliance with the Act's statutory requirements and administrative
220. Id at 169-77.
221. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). Since the initial printing of this comment, the Supreme Court has
directly addressed the issue of preemption. See 119811 49 U.S.L.W. 4445 (1980); note 245
infrn
222. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
223. See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra
224. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006,
1012-13 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting) (see text accompanying notes 108-10
supra); accord Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted 100
S. Ct. 1310 (1980).
225. § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976); see note 108 supra.
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regulations preempts a federal common law action. In Jones Falls,
the Fourth Circuit determined that it would be an anomaly to find
that the activities complained of in the suit, condoned under the
FWPCA's permit system,226 could be challenged by a federal common law nuisance claim. 227 Because the federal nuisance action was
created to fill statutory interstices when the legislation proved inadequate to resolve a water pollution controversy, compliance with the
requirements of the FWPCA eliminates the need for judicial lawmaking. To hold otherwise would be an affront to the decision-making powers of the legislative branch protected by the separation of
powers doctrine. Moreover, it would be contradictory to allow a
plaintiff to challenge pollution that had been statutorily condoned.
The preemption issue may be avoided when a state is seeking to
abate the pollution of an interstate or navigable body of water
caused by a source totally within its own borders. A policy of the
FWPCA is to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities of the states in controlling and abating water pollution.2 To
effectuate this policy, the Act provides that the EPA may grant a
state the authority to administer its own permit program under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)229 and
to regulate the pollution discharges of sources within its own jurisdiction. Moreover, a state may promulgate stricter water quality
standards than those currently in force or stricter effluent limitations than those promulgated by the EPA. 230 Pursuant to these provisions, a state may be able to control the polluting effects of an instate source without resorting to a federal common law nuisance
action.
If a state has opted not to become a NPDES state, the preemption issue may become relevant. In non-NPDES states, the EPA is
empowered to issue the requisite discharge permits2 31 and to directly
enforce effluent limitations for sources within the state. 232 An in-

226.
227.
228.
229.

§ 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976).
§ 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1978); see note 101 supro.
Pursuant to § 402(a) of the FWPCA Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976 &
Supp. 1978), a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) was estabfished. The program requires the EPA Administrator to issue permits to polluting sources
that allow these sources to discharge pollutants provided that the discharges will meet
other necessary requirements prescribed by the Act. Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)
(1976 & Supp. 1978), of the Act provides for state participation in the NPDES program
and allows the states to administer their own permit program for regulating pollution discharges into navigable waters in their own jurisdiction. The state program must be
approved by the EPA Administrator before being put into operation. See generally W.
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 451-62 (1977).
230. A state may choose to promulgate stricter standards or limitations pursuant to its authority under § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976) and § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
231. § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
232. § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
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state polluting source that is complying with the applicable federal
standards and discharging pollutants pursuant to an EPA-issued
permit can assert that it is acting under color of federal statutory
law that preempts federal common law actions. It is arguable that
the only option available to alleviate pollution in this situation is for
the state, acting pursuant to authority established by the Act,233 to
promulgate stricter pollution standards than those imposed by the
EPA. A state may, nevertheless, choose to seek relief in federal court
by instituting a federal common law public nuisance action. The
state could invoke the savings clause of the citizen suit provision of
the FWPCA,234 claiming that the other means of relief available to it
are provided by federal common law. Looking to the FWPCA for
guidance in formulating a remedy under the federal nuisance doctrine, the plaintiff could seek to have more stringent standards
imposed in light of the policy of the Act in general " 5 and a state's
23 6
power to do so as provided by the statute.
The argument that the FWPCA preempts a federal common law
nuisance action is convincing when a state attempts to abate the
extraterritorial pollution effects caused by interstate water pollution. The primary scheme of the FWPCA requires all dischargers to
comply with uniform technology-based effluent limitations.2 37 To
supplement water pollution control efforts, the Act establishes a procedure under which existing state water quality standards applicable to intrastate and interstate waters within a state's boundaries
are to be maintained.238 In addition, a state is required to "identify
those waters within its boundaries for which the effluent limitations
[promulgated pursuant to the Act] are not stringent enough to
239
implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters."
To protect these designated waters, a state must establish the "total
maximum daily load ' 2 40 for the discharge of particular pollutants as
specified by the EPA.241 An inevitable result of these statutory provisions and the section of the FWPCA authorizing a state to adopt
standards or limitations stricter than those prescribed under the
Act,24 2 is that some states will impose more stringent pollution con-

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

§ 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976); § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
§ 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976); see note 108 supra
§ 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
§ 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976); § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
§ 303(a)-(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(b) (1976).
§ 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1976).
§ 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C, § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1976).
§ 304(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2) (1976).
§ 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
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trol requirements than other states. One problem created by this
imbalance is that pollution emanating from a source within a more
lenient state will be carried by interstate waters into a more restrictive state and violate the higher water quality standards imposed by
the more pollution control minded state. The state with stricter
water quality standards may attempt to impose total maximum
daily loads upon sources located in the more lenient state. Although
the Act does not specifically prohibit this action, 24 3 a state's attempt
to impose more stringent standards upon sources outside its jurisdiction would require an illegal extension of a state's police powers to
another state and would raise serious issues of state sovereignty. In
asserting its immunity to a federal nuisance action, the polluting
source may claim that it is discharging pursuant to a properly issued
permit, complying with the applicable effluent limitations, and is not
violating any water quality standards of the state in which it is

located.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, has refused to foreclose a state with more stringent pollution controls from seeking federal common law relief from the interstate effects of water pollution emanating from a state with less restrictive standards. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 11,244 the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the FWPCA neither preempts federal
common law nor limits the relief available in a federal nuisance action.2 45 The court noted that the FWPCA authorizes a state to establish more stringent effluent limitations than those imposed under

243. See § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1976).
244. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. grunted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980). The opinion of the
Seventh Circuit represents the latest decision in the litigation that began with Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 5 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) (Envir. Rep. Cases) 2018 (N.D. 11. 1978); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp.
298 (N.D. Ill.
1973). See note 6 supru.
245. 599 F.2d 151, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted,100 S.Ct. 1310 (1980). Subsequent to
the initial printing of this comment, the Supreme Court reviewed and reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, [1981] 49 U.S.L.W. 4445 (1981).
The Court held that, since Illinois v.Milwaukee was decided, Congress has thoroughly
addressed this particular area of national concern - the control and prevention of water
pollution - and has thereby eliminated the need for lawmaking by the federal courts.
Congress' establishment of a comprehensive statutory scheme and regulatory program
through the enactment of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA "strongly suggests that
there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common
law." Id at 4449. Therefore, Illinois' right to a federal common law remedy was preempted by the passage of these amendments.
Analyzing the specific claims involved in the case, the Court first noted that the petitioners were discharging treated sewage pursuant to duly issued permits that incorporated the EPA-established effluent limitations. Id The Court concluded from these facts
that the problem of effluent limitations had been thoroughly addressed through the regulatory program established by Congress. Therefore, the federal courts lack the "authority
to impose more stringent limitations under federal common law than those imposed by the
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agency charged by Congress with administering this comprehensive scheme." Id Similarly, sewer overflow points are regulated by the permit process and controlled by expert
state and federal administrative agencies. Id at 4450. The detailed outline for controlling
the petitioners' sewer overflow points, which was delineated in the permits issued to the
petitioners, clearly indicated to the Court that the overflow problem had been addressed.
Moreover, when the petitioners violated their permits with respect to the conditions
placed upon their sewer overflows, the responsible state agency brought an enforcement
action against them. All these factors indicated that there was no statutory interstice to
be filled by federal common law.
Invocation of federal common law by the lower federal courts was particularly inappropriate, the Court concluded, in an area as complex as water pollution control Id at
4451. Difficult technical issues make this area unsuited for the "sporadic" and "ad hoc"
approach to water pollution control that would result from utilization of federal common
law.
The Court also determined that, in the 1972 amendments, Congress provided a state
whose waters may be adversely affected by the issuance of a permit in a neighboring state
ample opportunity to seek redress. Id When Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, no forum
existed in which Illinois could protect its interests unless federal common law was available. The administrative process created pursuant to the FWPCA now provides a state
whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit the opportunity to participate
in agency hearings regarding the granting of the permit. See § 402(b)(3), (b)(5), (d)(2)(A) &
(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(bH3), (b)(5), (d)(2)(A) & (d)(4) (1976 & Supp. 1978). In view of the
statutory scheme of relief, the Court concluded that it would be inconsistent with this
scheme if federal coufts could" 'write their own ticket' under the guise of federal common
law after permits have already been issued and permittees have been planning and operating in reliance on them." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4451.
The Court rejected the respondents' argument that several provisions of the FWPCA
express a congressional intent to preserve the federal common law remedy recognized in
Illinois v. Milwaukee. Id Section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976), provides that states can
implement and enforce more stringent limitations than those adopted under the Act.
Although the Court recognized that under § 510 state agencies, or even state courts
through state nuisance law, have the authority to establish more stringent controls and to
apply them to in-state pollution sources, the Court refused to find that this authority may
be exercised through federal common law actions to establish stringent limitations applicable to out-of-state pollution sources. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4451-52. Standards set under federal common law are federal standards, and thus the authority of states to impose more
stringent limitations under § 510 is irrelevant. Id at 4452. The Court also rejected the
view that § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976), the savings clause to the citizen suit provision, is to be broadly interpreted. Instead, the language of § 505(e) that "this section shall
not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under.., common
law... to seek any other relief" was interpreted narrowly by the Court to mean only that
nothing in the citizen suit provision should be read as precluding other remedies. Additionally, the Court was reluctant to read the reference in this section to "common law" as
encompassing federal as well as state common law. Finally, in reviewing the legislative
history of the FWPCA, the Court found no expression of congressional intent in support
of the continued validity of federal common law. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4452-53.
Justice Blackmun, together with Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. The dissent refused to accept the view that Congress, in passing the 1972 FWPCA amendments,
intended to cause an "automatic displacement" of the federal common law cause of
action. Id at 4453. Such a view fails to comprehend the unique role federal common law
plays in resolving interstate disputes, and it ignores the Court's "frequent recognition
that federal common law may complement congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies." Id The majority's opinion also undermines the intent of the Court, as
expressed in Illinois v. Milwaukee to promote a more unified federal approach to alleviating the problems of interstate pollution. Id at 4458. By eliminating the federal common
law of nuisance, the Court is encouraging states to rely more on their own statutory and
common law for assistance in filling the gaps in the federal scheme.
As a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, it is apparent that a state seeking relief from interstate water pollution caused by an out-of-state
source that is complying with the statutory and regulatory requirements is foreclosed
from relief under the federal common law of public nuisance.
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the Act itself. 46 The Seventh Circuit also discussed the statutory
provision that warns against construing the Act in a manner that
would limit the authority of any federal "officer or agency... under
any other law. . . not inconsistent with [the] Act. 2 47 Interpreting
this statutory language as encompassing the authority of the federal
courts, the court concluded that, when read together with the provision authorizing the states to promulgate stricter standards, this
provision clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to preempt
the federal common law of nuisance.2 48 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the dissent in Jones Falls on the relevancy of the
savings clause of the FWPCA citizen suit provision. 24 9 According to
both opinions, that provision preserves a party's right
to relief under
20
existing state and federal common law remedies.
After summarily rejecting the contention that compliance with
the Act preempted a federal common law action,2 51 the court dismissed the argument that the requirements prescribed by the
FWPCA constitute a ceiling on the relief available in a federal nuisance action.252 The court, however, did not ignore the statute in formulating an appropriate remedy. Rather than viewing the Act as
constituting the ceiling on relief, the court concluded that the underlying policies and principles of the Act are relevant in determining
the appropriate form of relief.2 53 The minimum treatment standards
imposed under the Act, therefore, are the appropriate starting point

246. 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted,100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980). The court was referring to § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
247. 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (quoting FWPCA
§ 311(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976)).
248. 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980).
249. Id at 163. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
250. 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980); Committee for the
Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
251. 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted,100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) "We reject defendants' contention that compliance with a discharge permit issued under the Act is a
defense in an action based on the federal common law of nuisance." Id But see New
England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979) (compliance
defense successfully raised in a federal common law nuisance action alleging interstate air
pollution).
252. 599 F.2d 151, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1979), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980).
253. Id at 164. As the court stated:
The conclusion that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended,
does not preempt the federal common law of nuisance or limit the relief available
in this case does not render the Act irrelevant. A statute that does not by its
terms govern the case before a court may contain indications of the legislature's
judgment on relevant issues of policy or provide an appropriate principle for
decision of the case. In applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water
pollution case, a court should not ignore the Act but should look to its policies
and principles for guidance.
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from which to develop more stringent control levels when necessary.
As the court stated in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee II,
[If] requirements more stringent than those imposed [under
the Act] are necessary to protect Illinois residents from the
harm caused or threatened by the defendants' sewage discharges, plaintiffs are entitled to have the more stringent
requirements imposed. We can think of no other reason for
Congress' preserving previously existing rights and remedies than to protect the interests of those who would be able
to show that the requirements imposed pursuant to the federal statute are inadequate to protect their interests.2 "
The position of the Seventh Circuit that the more stringent standards be considered echoes the Supreme Court's statement in
Illinois v. Milwaukee that "a State with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it
not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a
neighbor."2 55 The Seventh Circuit's decision indicates that, in the
interstate pollution context, a federal common law nuisance action
may be the only federal relief available for protecting the higher
standards of a more pollution control minded state. Additionally,
accepting a less stringent standard of water pollution control makes
little sense in view of the national interest in improving the overall
quality of the nation's environment.
One final consideration deserves mention in a discussion of the
ramifications of preemption. The federal courts' ability to formulate
remedies under the federal common law of public nuisance could be
severely restrained through amendments to the FWPCA. Explicit
statutory language could limit the term "common law" in the citizen
suit provision to state common law relief, specifically excluding
federal common law remedies. Congress could validate the compliance defense by stating that compliance with EPA promulgated
effluent limitations or stricter state standards incorporated into a
discharge permit, fulfills a party's obligations and insulates a potential defendant from a federal nuisance action. On a broader scale,
Congress could declare that the FWPCA and agency promulgated
regulations constitute the definitive boundaries for controlling water
pollution to the exclusion of any other means of relief for a party
seeking to abate the pollution of an interstate or navigable body of
water.

254. Id at 165.
255. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
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V. CONCLUSION
The federal common law of public nuisance has developed substantially since 1972. It has become well entrenched as a means
available to the federal judiciary for protecting the nation's interstate and navigable waters from the deleterious effects of pollution.
Application of the federal common law of nuisance provides one
innovative way for the federal courts to actively participate in
environmental protection and to assure that the policies of the extensive federal legislative scheme designed to protect this country's
water resources are effectuated. Over the years, the ambiguities
inherent in the Supreme Court's Illinois v. Milwaukee opinion have
been utilized by some courts to justify extending the application of
the federal nuisance doctrine. The policy that has emerged as the
predominant justification for fashioning this specialized federal common law is the overriding federal interest in controlling and abating
the pollution of the nation's waterways. As some courts have recognized, this goal cannot be achieved by restricting application of the
federal nuisance law exclusively to actions brought by states or
other governmental entities or to actions brought to preserve the
quality of interstate, rather than intrastate, waters.
Several well-reasoned decisions support the expansion of the federal common law nuisance principles. 256 These cases have considered
more carefully the intent of the Supreme Court in fashioning the federal nuisance doctrine than those courts advocating a more restrictive approach. In light of the developments of the federal nuisance
doctrine and the widespread public concern for environmental protection, 257 courts confronted with a water pollution action containing
a federal nuisance claim must evaluate their position regarding the
application of the federal common law of public nuisance with an eye
toward continual expansion of the nuisance doctrine. Because federal nuisance actions are equity suits and thus require a balancing of
all elements before the requisite relief can be determined, all relevant
circumstances would have to be considered in fashioning the appropriate remedy. In addition, plaintiffs instituting a federal nuisance
claim must still face other potential restraints - the standing
requirement, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the preemp-

256. See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (see text accompanying
notes 155-84 supra); National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir.), cert granted, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (see text accompanying notes 132-54 supra);
United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 14 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (Envir. Rep. Cases) 2010
(D. Conn. 1980).
257. In a recent survey conducted by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the CEQ
found that an overwhelming majority of Americans were concerned with the quality of
the environment and supported continued governmental efforts toward cleaning-up and
preserving the environment. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, PUBLIC OPINION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

(1980).
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tive effect of the FWPCA or other federal pollution control legislation - that may threaten the success of a federal common law nuisance action.
The federal common law of public nuisance has been extended
into other areas of environmental concern, including air 258 and
groundwater pollution.259 Federal nuisance law may also be a viable
source of relief in the campaign against abandoned hazardous waste
dumps that threaten to contaminate surface and groundwater6 0 In
view of the controversy among the federal courts of appeals as to the
appropriateness of expanding this doctrine, further guidance from
the Supreme Court regarding the bounds of the federal nuisance law
is necessary. Protection of our environment from further degradation dictates that such guidance must encourage expansive application of the federal common law of public nuisance in litigation involving water pollution as well as in actions involving threats to other
environmental resources.
Craig E. R. Jakubowics

258. See New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979).
259. See United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 14 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Envir. Rep. Cases)
2010 (D. Conn. 1980).
260. Comment, supra note 129, at 10105.

